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“When passing the ball to click here a player of his team, a soccer player can identify and select the proper target among many potential targets by the color of the jerseys. In this situation the physical targets are identical to potential targets of action (Figure 1A, left). However, when a striker is approaching the opponent goal, multiple alternative action goals have to be inferred from a single physical target (the goal keeper) via spatial transformation rules (Figure 1A, right). The striker might want to aim for the goal keeper, speculating that he or she will jump away, or for the opposite corner of the goal, hoping that the keeper stays. Recently,
a lot has been learned on how primates represent and decide between multiple physical targets in target-selection tasks, and how different frontal and parietal cortical areas contribute to target valuation and selection (Sugrue et al., 2005, Gold and Shadlen, 2007, Churchland et al., 2008, Rangel et al., 2008, Andersen and Cui, 2009, Kable and Glimcher, 2009, Kim and Basso, 2010, Bisley and Goldberg, 2010 and Cisek PLX4032 purchase and Kalaska, 2010). Little is known, however, about decision processes in rule-selection tasks, which require choosing among goals based on a spatial transformation rule (Tremblay et al., 2002), and in which alternative
goals might not be physically present as target stimuli, but have to be spatially inferred, like in the example of the striker. In rule-selection experiments, alternative movements are conducted under identical spatial sensory conditions, but according to different context-defined transformation rules (Wise et al., 1996 and Wallis and Miller, 2003). In antisaccade or antireach tasks (Figure 1A, right) a single visuospatial input is associated with two alternative movement goals: one that is directly cued by the sensory input (aim at the keeper), and another that has to be inferred from Electron transport chain a spatial cue by applying a remapping rule (aim at the corner of the soccer goal opposite to the keeper) (Crammond and Kalaska, 1994, Shen and Alexander, 1997, Schlag-Rey et al., 1997, Everling et al.,
1999, Zhang and Barash, 2004, Medendorp et al., 2005 and Gail and Andersen, 2006). Two alternative decision processes are conceivable in such rule-selection tasks. The sensorimotor system could first choose among the alternative rules, and then only compute one sensorimotor transformation to encode the single motor goal that is associated with the selected rule (rule-selection hypothesis). Alternatively, the system could first compute all potential sensorimotor transformations, and then select among the multiple resulting motor-goal options (goal-selection hypothesis). The difference between the rule- and goal-selection hypotheses should become obvious in areas of the brain that have “spatial competence” for movement planning, i.e., areas that exhibit spatially selective neural encoding of motor goal information.